Many commentators conclude that diese differences in die nature of ownership illustrate die need, from an economic efficiency perspective, to move as much commercial activity as possible into private ownership. W e agree widi diat con clusion. However, governments continue in practice to own commercial busi nesses, and it is in this context that this article addresses SOE governance issues.
Background to New Zealand's SOEs
Corporatisation and privatisation history. Prior to die creation of SOEs, govern ment-owned businesses in New Zealand were largely operated widiin various de partments whose functions also included advising die government on policy issues. This situation entailed frequent ministerial involvement in dieir operations; multi ple, sometimes unclear and often conflicting goals (such as employment creation and profitability); and dius unclear accountability. Their transformation into SOEs dirough corporatisation resulted in a clear commercial focus, and gready improved accountability arrangements. Since 1989 die government has privatised 13 SOEs for a total sale price of NZ$9.1 billion, in die context of 31 significant sales of gov ernment assets widi a total sale price of NZ$15.9 billion.
SOEs remain a major component of bodi die central government's balance sheet and die wider economy. As at 30 June 1997 dieir total assets of NZ$10.3 bil lion comprised about 18 per cent of die book value of total assets controlled by all government entities. Their total revenue equated to about 4 per cent of GDP. They are involved in a diverse range of business activities, including electricity gen eration and transmission, provision of postal and meteorological serv ices, coal and forestry production, farming and office accommodation, and air traffic control. How SOEs use die resources under dieir control therefore has a major impact on New Zealand's economic performance (see Table 1 ).
SO E governance arrangements. Each SOE is formed as a company under die
Companies Act 1993 and is subject to its general provisions. In addition, cacti SOE must comply widi specific governance and accountability provisions under the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. The Act sets each SOE die primary goal of being 'a successful business', and defines this as being as profitable as a comparable business not owned by the Crown, as well as being a good employer and socially responsible. SOE voting shares may not be sold widiout parliamentary approval. All SOEs are 100 per cent government owned, with the voting shares held equally by die two shareholding ministers: the Minister of Finance and the 'responsible Minister' (who by convention is normally the Minister for State Owned Enterprises). June 1997 , Wellington, New Zealand, 1997 Shareholding ministers hold the formal rights to appoint SOEs' directors, de termine dieir constitutions, and appropriate (on behalf of government) their resid ual earnings plus residual assets if they are wound up. The Companies Act requires die directors of an SOE to act in good laidi in what they believe to be in die best interests of die company.
The SOE Act requires each SOE board to provide die shareholding ministers an annual Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) setting out the scope of business of Üic SOE, along with its broad goals and specific performance targets. The share holding ministers monitor the performance of die SOE and its board of directors. The Act also permits die shareholding ministers to direct an SOE board to include particular items in die SCI or omit them from it. Use of diis power is subject to parliamentary scrudny. Moreover, if die shareholding ministers direct an SOE to provide goods or services diat it normally would not provide as part of a commer cial arrangement, the SOE can require die government to compensate it for any resultant financial detriment.
SOEs are taxed in die same way as privately owned companies and are subject to die same set of commercial, safety and healdi regulations as odier companies. They are able to raise debt in their own name, and diis debt is explicidy not under written by die government Market and regulatory environment. The government has sought to create an SOE only where diere is die prospect of competition in die markets for its prod ucts, or an effective regulatory regime is in place. Most of die existing SOEs do op erate in markets which are already compedtive or at least face die direat of compe tition. The exceptions fall into two categories: natural and statutory monopolies.
The nadonal electricity transmission grid, which "frans Power owns and oper ates, is die only significant natural monopoly.
This SOE is subject to a set of regulatory pricing constraints.
Two SOEs, NZ Post and die Airways Corporation, currendy operate in prod uct markets protected by statutory barriers to entry from odier suppliers. No com pelling economic reason appears to exist for diese barriers to continue. Indeed, in NZ Post's case legislation has recendy been introduced to die parliament which would remove die statutory barrier.
"file governance policies recommended below assume die SOE is operating in a compedtive product market. The statutory barriers to market entry arc best viewed as transitory issues, leaving die issue of natural monopoly. The definition of 'core business' is one policy recommendation diat may need to be tempered to take account of this (as elaborated below).
Differences between Government and Private Ownership
As mentioned above, die key differences between government and private owner ship lie in die nature of die rights and obligations in die two cases, and how diese differences affect incentives and decision making.
Under private ownership the owners typically have die right to income from die resources. The owners face direedy die wealdi effects from the way in which die _ This has happened on one occasion only.
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A 'natural monopoly' exists where output costs in a market for a particular product or its close substi tutes are minimised when there is only one supplier.
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The Airways Corporation also has a natural monopoly in some of its markets, but changes in tech nology are reducing the extent o f it resources are used. They also have the right to control and change the manner in which die resources are used, including die right to transfer ownership to anodier party. The combination of die right to income and die right to control provides private owners widi bodi die incendve and die ability to move dieir resources to dieir highest-value use. This approach to resource management lies at the heart of die allocadon of capital widiin open market economies.
Under government ownership die shareholding ministers have die right to in come on behalf of taxpayers. The shareholding ministers do not personally face any wealdi effects from die way in which resources are used, but are likely to face political costs or benefits from decisions diat they make in reladon to how resources are deployed. They also have a more limited set of rights to control and change die manner in which die resources are used. Shareholding ministers are not able to transfer ownership widiout parliamentary approval, and any direction diese minis ters give to an SOE is subject to parliamentary scrudny.
Government ownership breaks die nexus between personal wealdi effects and die ability to control and change resource use. Instead, government shareholders can be expected to be concerned primarily widi political (radier dian economic) outcomes, and to have limited ability to effect change. For diis reason, die alloca tion of capital under diis arrangement is likely to be significandy less efficient dian under private ownership.
These special features of die ownership structure of SOEs lead to a number of issues for die governance of diese companies. First, diey result in weak equity capi taI disciplines on the board and management. The absence of aedve trading in SOE shares, or of owners with a personal equity stake, weakens the discipline on diese companies to maximise value. Furthermore, the constraints on die share holders in reladon to divestment remove any credible takeover direat diat would otherwise face die board and management of an under-performing company. This weak discipline is likely to feed through to a tendency to operate less efficiendy dian otherwise would be die case, and to undertake projects dial are not jusdfiable if al lowance is made for the full opportunity cost of capital.
Second, diey lead to weak dcbt-liolder monitoring. Private debt holders have weak incendves to monitor an SOE's performance, to die extent diey consider SOEs to be implicidy government guaranteed. Aldiough all New Zealand SOE debt instruments are required to include an acknowledgment diat die debt is not guaranteed by die government, die financial markets have seen litde evidence of a New Zealand government being prepared to let any SOE fail financially. In cases of financial distress die government has provided addidonal equity or die promise of addidonal equity, radier dian rely on its limited liability status to restrict its financial exposure. Nevertheless, die structure of debt capital obligadons, which typically i r These rights are in practice constrained by a range of general legislative prohibitions on resource use, including for example die Resource Management AcL include specified cash payments throughout the life of the loan, can be expected g to provide a greater financial discipline on SOEs dian diat afforded by equity capital.
Finally, the ownership structure of SOEs leads to less certainty and clarity about shareholder business policy commitments. Shareholding ministers' commitment to a particular set of business policy parameters governing an SOE's operation is likely to be seen as less certain than if such a commitment were issued by priv ate share holders. Private shareholders tend to be more focused on a single clear goal ol im proving die value of dieir business. SOE shareholders, in contrast, typicaUy are likely to be influenced by multiple factors (such as changes of government and changes in electoral factors widiin an electoral term).
Forecasting how such fac tors are likely to impact on SOE-related policies is more complex and uncertain dian with private ownership.
Focusing on Core Activities
The remaining sections canvass policies to improve SOE governance from die per spective of a government concerned widi die overall efficiency of the economy. This is a wider perspeedve dian diat held by die private shareholder, which is con cerned only widi improving die value of die enddes it owns. This wider view results in policies diat bodi improve die efficiency widi which SOEs are governed and reduce die extent to which assets remain under SOE control (subject to constraints on privadsadon), as diere are alternadve (private) governance arrangements diat can be expected to yield more efficient results.
The policies fall into diree groups: focusing die company on its core aedvides; strengthening financial disciplines; and managing the ongoing reladonship between die government and SOEs. Focusing on core aedvides involves reducing die scale and scope of SOEs and changing dieir operadng structures.
Reducing scale and scope. Reducing die scale and scope of SOEs over dme can, if die resuldng opportunides are taken up by privately owned firms, be expected to improve overall economic efficiency. A sharper focus can be achieved, in part, by: not extending an SOE's scope beyond a clearly defined set of core business aedvi des or scale of operadon (for example, by declining proposed expansions, even diough die expected return may exceed die cost of extra capital required); divesdng assets that are not critical to the business; and limiting the level of equity to con strain the company's ability to broaden its scope or scale.
This constraint may impose opportunity costs on SO Es by preventing them from undertaking value-adding projects that could take advantage of economies of scale or scope. It is not likely to impose costs on the wider economy, however, if other firms can undertake these projects at the same or lesser incremental cost. Other firms could be expected to do so, except where an SOE holds a unique set of assets or capabilities relevant to die project.
Such uniquenesses most likely to exist where an SOE has a natural monopoly, such as Trans Power. In odier cases, as the market is able to sustain more dian one supplier, odier suppliers are likely to have similar assets and capabilides to die SOE, and dierefore can be expected to be able to access similar economies of scale or scope.
This focus on core acdvides has some important implications. First, it may re sult in SOEs not undertaking value-adding projects odierwise available to diem, whereas private investors are likely to undertake diem. Second, it means diat dirough time die reported value of an SOE business intentionally may be less than odierwise, and even decrease through time. This may occur, for example, if an SOE does not expand its core business, sheds non-core activities, and returns its excess capital to shareholders. Third, it is likely to mean diat the type of skills re quired lor directing and managing an SOE may change -widi a greater emphasis on people skilled in generating maximum value from a company that is not taking up investment opportunities as ordinarily would be die case.
Fourth, where an SOE is a dominant player in its product markets, public awareness of the con straints on its future expansion or diversification options may lower entry barriers for its potential competitors.
Lower barriers would result from die constraint on scope and scale, reducing die extent to which an SOE could engage in deterrent behaviour and improving allocative efficiency.
12
This approach, which focuses on incremental costs, assumes SOEs and privately owned firms face the same conditions in other dimensions of die project (such as the same output prices). In practice, market conditions are likely to change through time, which raises dynamic efficiency concerns as to the relative abilities o f different firms to adapt and take advantage o f new opportunities. It seems reason able to expect privately owned firms to be at least as efficient in a dynamic sense as an SOE, as diey are likely to liave stronger incentives to adapt 13 Uniqueness in tiiis case refers to any assets or capabilities diat the SOE holds diat provide it with a significant comparative advantage in relation to die particular project
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Where an SOE has a unique set o f assets or capabilities, any constraint on its scale or scope may impose costs on the wider economy (if odier firms incur greater economic costs than die SOE would in undertaking die project). These costs could be ameliorated by other firms gaining access to these unique assets or capabilities (for instance, through franchising, leasing, or some odier access agree ment). If access is impracticable, expanding die scope or scale of die SOE could be appropriate.
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A key assumption in diis approach is die availability of directors and managers diat are capable and willing to work to diis objective. In New Zealand the means of implementing this strategy already exist. The State Owned Enterprises Act, for example, provides mechanisms for shareholding ministers to influence the size and scope of an SOE's business, most notably die SCI diat must be negotiated each year between an SOE board and die sharehold ers.
Operating structure changes. A second means of focusing an SOE on its core value-adding acdvides is to consider altemadve ways of structuring its operadng ar rangements. The key boundary here is diat between relying on die SOE's internal governance rules for decision making and contract enforcement, and relying on external market mechanisms. Options include: management contracdng, franchis ing, contracting out, and leasing out. These opdons have die effect of altering the boundary of die company, and can be viewed as wididrawing from direct involve ment in various parts of die value chain of a business. In die extreme, an SOE could become a shell (or virtual) company, widi its primary function being limited to managing a set of contracts (buying not making).
The suitability of die following possible operadng structure opdons will depend on an SOE's circumstances.
• Management contracting entails hiring an outside firm to manage some dis crete part of a company's operadons or to exercise operadonal control over die endre operadons. It would mean devolving some rights to die contractor in return for various benefits such as access to specialist competencies.
• Franchising involves leasing out the right to use a clearly identifiable 'brand name' or odier intellectual property owned by die SOE. This enhances unit managers' incentives to control costs as diey have a direct stake in its profits.
• Contracting out means buying some of die goods and services needed to produce finished goods from an outside company. The benefits come from die greater use of competitive-market pressures.
• leasing out entails transferring some of die rights of ownership to a lessee for a specified period. It could be used when die government is willing to de volve control of a portion of a business into die hands of someone who can operate it more efficiendy.
fliese opdons may improve efficiency in one or more of die following ways: by shifting some of die residual daimancy rights and obligations outside die company, as a means of overcoming die limitations of the SOE governance arrangements; by harnessing die benefits of competitive markets for intermediate products or serv ices; and/or benefiting from stronger incentives to produce outputs at least cost, by shifting some strategic and/or management control to parties that typically have stronger incentives to minimise costs.
Strengthening Financial Disciplines
The capital structure of a company determines the nature of die claims on a com pany's cash Hows and die company's financial flexibility.
In die two polar cases, debt financing commits a company to specified servicing costs (in cash), whereas equity financing provides die company widi greater financial discretion. There is a range of intermediate financial instruments. Empirical evidence suggests there is a range of debt:equity rados over which a particular company's cost of capital is minimised, allowing some latitude in die mix of debt and equity without signilicandy altering its overall cost of capital.
A degree of financial flexibility is necessary to enable a company to accommo date downside deviadons from its business plan widiout major disruption to its op erations or undermining its market position. However, excess flexibility can be cosdy, pardcularly where equity capital disciplines are weak, to die extent diat it: reduces external discipline on managers to control costs; increases die likelihood that management will invest in projects diat do not at least return their cost of capital (diat is, projects diat erode company value); and signals to potential new entrants die possibility diat the SOE has the financial ability to deter potendal competitors from entering its market.
Most SOEs typically have had reladvely large free cash flows after meeting all costs, including debt obligadons, but before paying dividends. These free cash flows have been, and remain, die primary source of SOE expansion; diey <dso re duce die discipline on management to maintain and enhance company value.
Reducing die level of diese free cash Hows by paying diem out to die suppliers of capital could be achieved in two ways: substituting private debt for government equity, and/or raising dividend levels. Either option would strengdien financial dis ciplines on an SOE, and could be expected to lead to more efficient use of capi tal.
SubsUtudng private debt for equity would raise die requirement on SOEs to meet dieir capital costs in cash, and diereby reduce die cash pool available for use at die discrcUon of a board. This would place greater discipline on managers to con trol costs and only take on diose projects which return at least dieir cost of capital. It may also strengthen the incentives on the debt holders to monitor the SOEs. Raising dividend levels would raise the requirement on SOEs to meet their remain ing equity cost of capital in cash, thereby reducing their access to cash reserves.
Managing the Relationship between SOEs and Government
Continued government ownership of SOEs raises the issue of how the relationship between government and the SOE should be managed. Managing this relationship warrants close attention in the absence of the salutary impact of capital market pres sures that privately owned businesses typically face. In New Zealand this relation ship is prescribed in broad terms by the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. This section explores various aspects of the relationship within that context. Clarifying and communicating the government's intentions. At present, SOEs and the shareholding ministers (and their advisers) tend to debate issues about the capi tal structure and scope of an SOE's business case by case. The focus of such de bates is usually on implications for the SOE's value. Discussion of the issues, and any ensuing decisions, would be better informed if the shareholding ministers were both to articulate their medium-term preferences and expectations, and to com municate them to tiie interested parties. A public commitment to clearly stated ex pectations would enhance their credibility by raising the cost to the shareholders of deviating from them. A possible means for achieving this would be for the share holders to issue a statement of shareholder expectations (SSE). Such a statement would apply to SOE policy some of the principles already adopted in relation to fiscal policy through the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
If the shareholding ministers were to signal to each SOE that it should focus on its core activities and pay out more of its free cash Hows, they would also need to communicate clearly that the value of the government's equity in the SOE may de crease over time. This would encourage SOE management to concentrate on die task at hand, radier dian seeking out value-adding projects in related (but not core) areas of business.
In summary, providing greater certainty and clarity to an SOE's board and management about its shareholders' expectadons and preferences, and about die higher costs to shareholders if diey deviate from a publicly committed direction, should improve die efficiency of SOE governance arrangements. More pardcularly, it could be expected to facilitate management of SOEs widiin clear parameters diat are aligned with die preferences of the shareholders. Monitoring and value-based reporting. The relative lack of capital-market related pressure on SOEs means that the shareholding ministers need to rely on adminis trative monitoring procedures to hold SOE boards accountable. Current practice includes setting expected financial performance targets in the SCI for the future three years, and reporting against those targets at quarterly, half-yearly and full-year intervals. Boards are required to explain significant deviations from expected fi nancial performance targets. In addition, each SOE may be subject to a business review at periodic intervals, normally no more frequent than every five years. Such monitoring provides a suitable basis for the shareholding ministers to consider the future direction of the company and any changes that may be required.
This monitoring is basically reactive and focused on published ex post financial performance measures.
The absence of capital market disciplines to help align the interests of SOE shareholders and their agents (boards and management) forces greater reliance on in-house performance monitoring. Setting clear goals for SOE boards to achieve, and strengthening incentives for them to do so (consistent with the SSE), is one form of such monitoring.
The general adoption of value-based reporting (VBR) by SOEs would enhance shareholding ministers' ability to assess the extent to which an SOE is creating or eroding value. VBR involves a company reporting its economic returns, the oppor tunity cost of the capital used to produce those returns, and the extent to which its various activities add to or reduce its value. It is a very useful tool that the share holding ministers could use both to set performance targets and to measure per formance, in a way that takes account of the opportunity cost of die equity capital involved.
Director appointments and performance. An SOE's board of directors has a cru cial role in maintaining and improving the company's performance. From die gov ernment's viewpoint, therefore, it is important bodi to obtain sufficient suitably skilled directors to oversee these companies, and to ensure diat each board of direc tors has strong incentives to enhance a company's value. This is not a small task: diere are about 90 SOE directors, and some 350 directors of all Crown-owned companies.
The following measures could help die government to secure die best perform ance from its SOE directors.
• Ensuring independence and objectivity in die selection process. This needs to involve selecting SOE directors on die basis of systematically matching candidates' skills and experience to meet a particular set of job specifications tailored (as necessary) to suit a particular SOE.
See Rappaport (1986) and Stewart (1991) for a comprehensive explanation o f VBR.
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•
Clearly specifying the equity holders ' expectations o f directors. This could be achieved by die equity holders providing clear terms of reference for individ ual directors when diey are appointed, and each board as a whole dirough the proposed SSE.
• Strengthening directors' incentives to ensure die company performs well. Directors' incentives could be strengthened by introducing performancerelated rewards and sanctions, and enhancing accountability mechanisms (including shareholder monitoring of die SOE, and VBR). This should in clude re-appointment being contingent on good performance (given factors widiin die board's direct sphere of influence), dius preserving the value of reputadon.
Conclusions
In New Zealand a significant number of SOEs have now been privadsed. For diose SOEs that remain government owned (and where privadsadon is ruled out), die important issue of how best to govern diem remains. This article has oudined a set of measures diat, if adopted, would both limit exposure to the problem of SOEs' inherendy weak governance structure, and strengthen incendves for SOEs to per form where the exposure remains. Aspects of this approach to strengthening die governance of SOEs may be able to be extended to die government's wider ownership interests, for example to its investments in housing, financial services, liealdi and educaUon.
